During the last decade, the international economic order has been in significant turmoil – from the immediate and ancillary impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the growing scope and economic might of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) coalition to the global de-dollarization campaign. Now the decision by US President Donald Trump to institute worldwide tariffs is only adding to economic and financial uncertainty.
One must remember that Trump is not your typical conservative dedicated to decades of support for what they believed was free trade. He is a populist who is more dedicated to what he believes is fair trade, and as he has stated many times over the years, he believes the United States has been taken advantage of by both adversaries and allies regarding the terms of trade.
Indeed, it is an ignored fact that other countries have often charged higher tariffs on American goods than the US charges on theirs, but tariff disparities are only part of what upsets American populists.
“Globalization of markets led to the transfer of manufacturing industries from the US to China, causing job loss, worsening of the socio-economic conditions in the US industrial heartland, and the rise of populist movements to oppose this process of globalization,” stated an article in the April 2025 edition of the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. “After 9/11, the US began a series of “democracy promotion” military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.
Their failures, despite huge US budgetary investments and grand expectations, generated a popular backlash against liberal elites.”
Consequently, bold actions that roil markets and upset traditional elite economic expectations in his view are justified if the end goal is to rebalance trade and make it more fair to the United States. In this, he is backed by the thousands of American workers who have seen their jobs disappear overseas.
Strategic Motivations and Initial Impact
Concern about trade imbalances also carries strategic weight as highlighted during the COVID pandemic when increased attention was paid to the level of foreign dependence on even basic medicines manufactured overseas, especially by China. Moreover, Chinese dominance of critical minerals needed for consumer, industrial and military technology is rendered more concerning by America’s tenuous relationship with China, which has not been reluctant to threaten or even actually restrict export of such processed supplies.
The global tariff regime Trump instituted hit major trading partners in Canada, Mexico and Europe as well as China, albeit much harder on the Asian giant. The basic 10 percent tariffs included developing countries such as in Africa, although countries such as South Africa were hit with larger tariff percentages.
Not long after instituting these tariffs, Trump issued a 90-day delay. Some in the media have referred to this abrupt pause to an equally abrupt implementation as Trump backing down.
The timing of the new US tariffs, coinciding with the impending expiration of AGOA in September 2025, suggests a potential strategic pivot in US trade policy towards Africa.
This illustrates an ignorance of who he is. One does not have to read his book The Art of the Deal to understand the negotiating principle on which his actions in this matter are based.
If you want a 50 percent adjustment, you might ask for 100 percent to give yourself room to negotiate down to the level you actually seek.
There reportedly was great turmoil even within the administration in Washington to the tariff plan and set high-ranking figures within the group to criticize one another. Elon Musk, a major figure in this administration’s effort to trim government significantly and root out corruption has been hurt to the tune of billions of dollars by the turmoil inherent in the widespread tariff plan.
Certainly, the financial pain felt by Musk and other friendly wealthy individuals would have significant sway over Trump’s decision to pause the implementation of the tariff regime, but just as plausible is the fact that dozens of governments are calling for negotiations on trade, which would justify a pause to enable talks to take place. The zero-zero option on reciprocal tariffs likely would never have surfaced if not for the threats of tariff levels that would disrupt economies.
India and the United States reportedly already have agreed on a mutually beneficial trade negotiating framework.
Africa’s Vulnerability and the AGOA Factor
Of course, the pause in tariffs doesn’t include China, and the two countries are engaged in a major trade war with tariff levels that preclude free trade on both sides. China and the United States have the might to battle this out – at least for a while – despite the economic pain they cause one another, but what about African and other developing countries?
The 10 percent global tariff level has been paused, but will African governments have the leverage to successfully reach a conclusion on trade that safeguards their interests?
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 provided for tariff-free, quota-free treatment for 6,400 items – including the 4,600 items under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) – exported to the United States from qualifying African countries. Of course, in the last quarter century, various countries have been suspended from accessing these tariff and quota benefits – seven in the last two years alone.
Zimbabwe was excluded from the beginning despite remaining a major African trading partner largely through GSP without access to the 1,800 specifically AGOA benefits.
AGOA was not created by executive fiat; it is statutory. However, it has been suspended by the executive branch for select countries for reasons lately focusing on human rights concerns as opposed to trade limitations on American companies – seven suspensions in the last two years.
Still, a general violation of the AGOA law was avoided by the suspension of the tariff implementation. But again, how successful will African countries be in negotiating a mutually beneficial tariff regime with the United States?
Tariff Disparities and Non-Tariff Challenges
The timing of the new US tariffs, coinciding with the impending expiration of AGOA in September 2025, suggests a potential strategic pivot in US trade policy towards Africa. Rather than continuing with unilateral preferential treatment, the US administration appears to be signaling a move towards a more reciprocal, and potentially protectionist, approach.
This shift is underscored by the fact that the tariffs were announced and implemented prior to the AGOA expiration date, indicating a proactive reshaping of the trade landscape.
Beyond AGOA, the United States has a limited number of formal trade agreements with African nations. The US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, which came into effect in 2006, stands as the sole comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the US and an African country.
In addition to this, the US has established Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with various African countries and regional blocs, including the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), with ongoing discussions with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). While TIFAs provide strategic frameworks for dialogue on trade and investment issues, they do not constitute free trade agreements with reciprocal tariff reductions.
The significant disparities in the alleged tariff rates across African nations highlight the diverse trade policy landscape of the continent. The wide range, from the very high rates claimed for Lesotho and Madagascar to the considerably lower rates for countries like Kenya and Egypt, likely reflects the varied economic development levels, industrial strategies, and trade priorities of individual African nations.
This heterogeneity makes it challenging to formulate a singular statement regarding African tariffs on US goods.
The African countries that were facing elevated tariffs include Lesotho at 50 percent, Madagascar at 47 percent, Mauritius at 40 percent, Botswana at 37 percent, Angola at 32 percent, Libya at 31 percent, South Africa at 31 percent, Algeria at 30 percent, Tunisia at 28 percent, Ivory Coast at 21 percent, Namibia at 21 percent, Zimbabwe at 18 percent, Malawi at 18 percent, Zambia at 17 percent, Mozambique at 16 percent, Nigeria at 14 percent, Chad at 13 percent, Equatorial Guinea at 13 percent, Cameroon at 12 percent, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo at 11 percent.
The US tariff policy appears to disproportionately impact smaller African economies that have a significant trade surplus with the US, importing relatively little from the US, as exemplified by Lesotho and Madagascar. The formula used for calculating the tariffs penalizes such trade imbalances, regardless of the overall economic size or development level of these nations.
Furthermore, the exemptions granted for specific critical goods suggest a strategic consideration by the US to mitigate potential disruptions to its own supply chains and essential industries. The complexities surrounding the tariffs on automobiles, particularly concerning South Africa’s substantial automotive exports to the US, highlight the potential for sector-specific impacts and the need for further clarification and potential negotiations.
The US tariff program generally is more aimed at trade deficits than foreign tariffs on US goods. The methodology employed by the US to calculate these “reciprocal” tariffs involves taking the US goods trade deficit with a particular country, dividing it by the total value of imports from that country into the US, and then halving the resulting percentage.
However, certain categories of goods have been exempted from these new tariffs, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber articles, gold, energy products, and certain critical minerals. Consumer electronic goods such as phones have been added to the list of exempt products.
The situation regarding automobiles, which were already subject to a 25 percent tariff under Section 232, has been evolving, with any new tariffs adding further complexity.
For African countries, non-tariff barriers largely were at fault for the trade deficits the United States is targeting, and that will be very problematic to unravel.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) defines a non-tariff barrier as “any obstacle to international trade that is not an import or export duty. They may take the form of import quotas, subsidies, customs delays, technical barriers, or other systems preventing or impeding trade”.
According to the World Trade Organization, non-tariff barriers to trade include import licensing, rules for valuation of goods at customs, pre-shipment inspections, rules of origin (‘made in’), and trade prepared investment measures.
A 2019 United Nations Trade and Development agency report concluded that trade costs associated with non-tariff measures were more than double those of traditional tariffs.
In order to address these non-tariff barriers in Africa, it will be necessary to further develop the consumer sector to allow them to purchase more American and other foreign goods the choose and facilitate training and infrastructure needed to speed up goods moving through customs. It must be acknowledged, though, that some of the delay in moving goods through customs is due to the benefit some officials gain through demurrage charges – costs for storing goods locked in the customs process.
That can be an issue of rent-seeking that must be ended for long-term benefit, and that is a matter of will to do so.
The residual effects of colonial policies have skewed business practices in African countries, which was demonstrated by the hesitance of some African governments to sign onto the African Continental Free Trade Agreement until important economic entities could figure out how this would affect their profits. The same will be true for the tariff negotiations with the United States.
That may mean tortuous negotiations to overcome potentially damaging US tariff levels in Africa. Hopefully, 90 days will be enough time to resolve these issues equitably.